

Education, Income and Support for Suicide Bombings Evidence from Six Muslim Countries

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Perpetrators use suicide bombings as a high profile cost-effective tactic in the hope of producing cultural, economic, social, or political change (Berman and Laitin, 2006; Pape, 2003). In different conflicts, suicide bombings have targeted civilians, military, diplomatic or political personnel, or a combination of the above (Gambetta, 2006). Such attacks were rarely used prior to the 1980s, but their numbers and the damage they cause have increased dramatically (Enders and Sandler, 2005). As of 2005, more than 350 suicide bombings were perpetuated in countries other than Iraq (Hoffman 2006, 131). In Iraq, there have been more than 545 suicide bombings between the US-led invasion of May 2003 and the end of September 2007 (O'Hanlon and Campbell 2007, 10).¹ In addition to claiming thousands of human casualties, suicide bombs destroy infrastructure and private property, weaken the investment climate, undermine the tourism industry, and lead to the adoption of inferior policies to satisfy the perpetrators (Frey, Luechinger, and Stutzer, 2007; Drakos and Kutan, 2003).²

¹ Figures come from The Brookings Institution's monthly report "Iraq Index" for 1 October 2007, available online at <http://www.brookings.edu/saban/iraq-index.aspx> (accessed June 4, 2008).

² We define suicide bombing as events in which terrorists actually killed themselves rather than events in which they fought to death. The private and social costs of suicide bombings are fewer than those of civil wars, homicides or traffic accidents (Englehart and Kurzman, 2006).

Princeton economist Alan Krueger (2007, 12-13) argues in his well-received and broadly-read book *What Makes a Terrorist* that education and income have no discernible impact on support for terrorism.³ He embarks on this exercise to refute what he perceives to be “popular stereotypes that poverty and inadequate education cause terrorism”. Indeed, he frames his study as a response to statements by a large number of politicians, diplomats, social scientists and Nobel laureates whom he believes to have succumbed to this well-intentioned misconception. They include, among others, U.S. Presidents George W. Bush and Bill Clinton, First Lady Laura Bush, Former Vice President Al Gore, previous British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and Nobel Laureates Muhammad Yunus, the Dalai Lama and Eli Wiesel. Krueger is concerned with the policy consequences of believing in such a relationship, which is reasonable considering that billions of dollars in government expenditure and foreign aid are being directed to educational development in Muslim countries in the hope of reducing public support for suicide bombing and other forms of terrorism (Novelli and Robertson, 2007). Krueger attempts to show that income and education do not affect support for (or participation in) suicide bombings by analogizing terrorism to hate crime and drawing on the literature on hate crimes, considering bivariate relationships between education and support for suicide bombings from two surveys, and by summarizing the findings of studies of perpetrators (Krueger 2007, Chapter 1).

The intuition of the politicians, scholars and intellectuals who argue that education should discourage support for violent attacks seems sensible because formal education should equip people with the cognitive skills and tools to understand various cultures and societies, resulting in tolerance, civility and social cohesion (Dewey, 1922). In short, education should instill values that would make suicide bombing less attractive. Moreover, educated people exert greater political and social influence and would therefore be expected to steer others from adopting tactics such as suicide bombings. Educated people may refuse to vote for political parties that support suicide bombings such as Hamas in Palestine, may encourage the use of less gruesome tactics during episodes of conflict, and may be more inclined to use institutional means instead of confrontation to resolve grievances.

³ See also Krueger and Maleckova 2003.

Simultaneously, such arguments are very Western-centric because they imply that the use of aggressive militancy against Western forces and targets when Western countries are engaged in protracted conflicts in Muslim countries is either immoral or illogical. Krueger's (2007, 50-51) most powerful critique of those who argue that it is poverty and ignorance that drive militant attacks is that the perpetrators have genuine grievances that motivate their tactics.

This is not a trivial debate. In addition to their own real and symbolic impacts, support for suicide bombings is the tip of a large iceberg of disenchantment with US foreign policy. When a member of the public in a Muslim country opts to support the use of this tactic, he may very well have reached the point of believing in the existence of a terminal war of religions or civilizations. The confrontations that stem from mutual hostility have been costly for Muslims and Westerners alike in both lives and economic prosperity.

Public attitudes towards suicide bombings also matter because such attacks do not occur in a vacuum. Political scientist Robert Pape and sociologist Jeff Goodwin contend that organizations executing suicide bombing campaigns require substantial public (or community) support in order to replenish their membership, finance the bombings, and avoid detection and elimination by government forces (Pape 2005, 81; Goodwin, 2006, 326-327). Furthermore, such organizations need the wider public to accept the suicide bombers as martyrs for such attacks to be valuable. And many suicide bombings seem organized to help mobilize the support of a population against others (e.g. the Iraqi al-Qaeda's effort to mobilize Sunnis against Shi'a in Iraq) or the powers that be (including perhaps the attacks of 9/11).⁴

In spite of the matter's importance, little social scientific research besides Krueger's has been done on the relationship between education and support of suicide bombings. In a literature review titled "What do we really know about (suicide) terrorism?" Goodwin (2006) never mentions education or schooling. Similarly, Hoffman (2006) provides a thorough discussion on how policymakers can respond

⁴ See Siqueira and Sandler (2006) for competition for public support between governments and organizations using suicide attacks.

to suicide bombings but his prescriptions do not involve formal education for the public. Those who deal with education, focus on the education of perpetrators, not the general public.⁵

We weigh on this debate by moving beyond Krueger's bivariate relationships to a multivariate analysis of the correlates of support for suicide bombings against two types of distinct targets: civilians within the respondent's country and US military and supporting personnel in Iraq. Both sides of the debate do not distinguish between the two types of intended targets for such attacks and therefore miss an important part of the story. Twenty-two percent of respondents in the dataset of Muslim publics we use find suicide bombings on civilians to be sometimes or often justified while 38% believe such attacks on foreigners in Iraq to be justifiable. Such a difference suggests different motivations and correlates of support. We therefore study the correlates of attitudes of Muslim publics towards both types of attacks separately to gauge the effect of education and poverty.

We argue that increased education reduces support for suicide bombings against civilians within the respondent's home country because such attacks raise complex moral issues that educated individuals are better equipped to handle (Kohlberg 1981). Conversely, education has statistically marginal effect on support for suicide bombings against foreign occupiers of Muslim lands among Muslim publics. Targeting the army and support system of an overwhelmingly powerful occupier by any means possible does not raise the same ethical dilemmas that targeting civilians does, and the American military presence in Iraq is widely viewed as illegitimate among Muslim publics.⁶

We make our argument by exploring the correlates of support for suicide bombings in six Muslim countries: Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, and Turkey. Each of these countries

⁵ Nasra Hussain's ethnographic study supports a direct link between education and willingness to participate in suicide bombings. After investigating the profiles of around 250 suicide bombers and their handlers shortly after 9/11, she finds that "none of them were uneducated, desperately poor, simple-minded, or depressed. Many were middle class, and unless they were fugitives, held paying jobs" (Hussain, 2001). Reporters Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey conclude after investigating the backgrounds of 75 terrorists involved in attacks against Westerners that 53 percent had attended college ("The Madrassa Myth," *The New York Times*, 14 June 2005, available at <<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/14/opinion/14bergen.html>> (accessed June 4, 2008).

⁶ "US image up slightly, but still negative," Report from the Pew Global Attitudes Project, June 2005, Available at <<http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?PageID=803>> (accessed June 4, 2008).

has experienced devastating suicide bombings within their borders in recent years and has a large Muslim population sympathetic to Afghans and Iraqis resisting the US-led occupation of their land. This allows us to unravel the correlates of attitudes towards attacks on civilians and occupiers.

Data and Case Selection

Dataset. The data on public attitudes in our countries of interest comes from the Pew Global Attitudes Project (PGAP), carried out by the Pew Research Center—a non-partisan think-tank based in Washington, DC.⁷ The samples from Indonesia (original sample size=1022), Jordan (N=1000), Lebanon (N=1000), and Turkey (N=1003) are representative of the Muslim population in the country but the samples from Morocco (N=1000) and Pakistan (N=1225) are disproportionately urban. All respondents are Muslims age eighteen or above.

The six countries. The sample countries are predominantly Muslim but from different regions of the Muslim world, including East Asia (Indonesia), South Asia (Pakistan), the Middle East (Jordan and Lebanon), North Africa (Morocco), and Eurasia (Turkey). They have a combined Muslim population of around 500 million, about forty percent of the world's total. Some are more economically developed than others.⁸ Three are democracies (Indonesia, Lebanon, and Turkey), one vacillates between democracy and military rule (Pakistan), and two are monarchies with weak parliaments (Morocco and Jordan). They have

⁷ The specific PGAP dataset is the publicly available *Spring 2005 17-Nation Survey*, including surveys on Canada, China, France, Germany, Great Britain, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Netherlands, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Spain, Turkey, and the United States. We exclude the samples from countries with a small share of Muslims (Canada, China, France, Germany, Great Britain, India, Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Spain, and the United States) because there are no questions on suicide bombing. Instead, we use the samples from predominantly Muslim countries. The data set is available at <<http://pewglobal.org/datasets>>. The PGAP is funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. The Pew Research Center describes the PGAP as “a series of worldwide public opinion surveys that encompasses a broad array of subjects ranging from people’s assessments of their own lives to their views about the current state of the world and important issues of the day. More than 150,000 interviews in 54 countries have been conducted as part of the project’s work.”

⁸ The purchasing power adjusted per-capita incomes in 2005 for the countries are as follows: Indonesia: \$4232; Jordan: \$5542; Lebanon: \$5457; Morocco: \$4956; Pakistan: \$2722; Turkey: \$9107. Source: World Economic Outlook Database for April 2007 (International Monetary Fund, 2007). Available at <<http://imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2007/01/data/index.aspx>> (accessed June 4, 2008).

all experienced internal strife and instability in recent memory even though Morocco and Jordan are somewhat more stable than the rest. Three are Arab-majority countries (Jordan, Lebanon and Morocco).

More importantly for our research question, all six countries have experienced suicide bombings in recent memory. Lebanon's association with suicide bombing began in 1983 when Hizballah executed the first such attacks in the Middle East. Hizballah attackers drove and detonated explosive-laden trucks into barracks of U.S. Marines and French paratroopers who were sent to strengthen the Gemayel government established with the help of Israel. Such attacks, particularly against Israeli troops occupying southern sections of Lebanon, have been carried out by various groups in addition to the fundamentalist Shi'a organization Hizballah—the Syrian Nationalist Party, socialist groups, and a communist group (Lester, Yang, and Lindsay, 2004). The targets have included civilians, politicians, and foreign militaries and diplomats.

In Indonesia, suicide bombings followed the East Asian crisis and the overthrow of President Suharto's authoritarian government in 1998 (Chen, 2007). These events worsened attitudes towards the West, and gave rise to the violent Islamist group Jamaa Islamiya (Hefner, 2000). The Jamaa Islamiya claimed responsibility for Indonesia's most devastating attacks—the Bali bombings of 2002 and 2005 that killed 164 foreign nationals and 38 Indonesian citizens (Hefner and Zaman 2007).

Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian-born leader of al-Qaida in Iraq, claimed responsibility for the 2005 suicide bombings in Jordan that targeted civilians. The bombings took place near international hotels in Amman, and claimed 60 lives and injured 115 others. The Jordanian government's strong alliance with the United States arguably motivated al-Zarqawi to plan these attacks.⁹

Morocco experienced suicide bombings in 2003 and 2007 in Casablanca, killing 45 civilians and injuring over a hundred others. Though the attacks targeted Westerners and Israelis, casualties were mostly Moroccan civilians but also included some Western and Israeli tourists, and American and

⁹Jonathan Finer and Naseer Mehdawi, "Bombings Kill Over 50 At 3 Hotels In Jordan: Coordinated Attack in Amman Linked to Zarqawi's Network," *Washington Post*, Thursday, November 10, 2005; Page A01, available at <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/09/AR2005110901185.html>> (accessed June 4, 2008).

European diplomats.¹⁰ It remains unclear whether the attacks were carried out by homegrown militants or an international terrorist network. A series of suicide bombings also targeted American diplomatic offices in Casablanca, though there were no casualties besides the bombers; Islamist extremists who want to topple the monarchy were blamed for the attacks.¹¹ Moroccan government reports also claim that certain rural areas of Morocco export suicide bombers to Iraq.¹²

Pakistan has been plagued by suicide bombings for over two decades. Suicide bombings have been used by warring extremist Shi'a and Sunni groups. More recently, a Taliban-style movement of clerics and students has been using suicide bombings against government officials it blames for their allegiance to the United States. The targets of the attacks have included military personnel, political personnel, legal figures, and civilians (both local and foreign). Since 2003, there have been at least 21 incidents of suicide bombings, which have killed 382 and injured 882; thousands more have been harmed by other forms of guerrilla warfare and terrorism.¹³

Finally, suicide bombings in Turkey have been carried out by Kurdish militants and al Qaeda-linked extremists. The Kurdish rebellion against Turkish rule has produced at least two suicide bombings targeting military and political personnel that left 22 dead (Goodwin, 2006). The al Qaeda-linked suicide bombings, in contrast, killed 58 civilians and injured 101 others.¹⁴

The two dependent variables. The PGAP only asked Muslim respondents from the countries above about their attitudes towards suicide bombings. To measure public attitudes towards suicide bombings against civilians, we use the following PGAP question:

¹⁰ "Terror blasts rock Casablanca" *BBC News*, Saturday, 17 May, 2003, online at <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3035803.stm>> (accessed June 4, 2008).

¹¹ "Two bombers attack U.S. targets in Morocco," *Reuters*, Sat Apr 14, 2007, available online at <<http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL14471151>> (accessed June 4, 2008).

¹² "Moroccan Village Funnels Suicide Bombers to Iraq," *NPR Morning Edition*, April 25, 2007, available online at <<http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9814476>> (accessed June 4, 2008).

¹³ "Major incidents of Terrorism-related violence in Pakistan, 1988-2008," *SATP*, available at <<http://www.satp.org/satporgrp/countries/pakistan/database/majorincidents.htm>> (accessed June 4, 2008).

¹⁴ "Turkey says suicide bomber carried out attack: Hints of Kurdish involvement as police determine source of Ankara blast," *Associated Press*, May 23, 2007, available at <<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18817425/>> (accessed June 4, 2008).

Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets [in our country] are justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel that this kind of violence is often justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely justified, or never justified?

Half of the Muslim respondents were asked the above question with the words “in our country” included and half were asked the question without them. We combine the answers in one variable we call *civilians*, dropped recipients answering “don’t know” and “refused” from the sample, and coded the dependent variable as follows: never justified=0, rarely justified=1, sometimes justified=2, often justified=3.

To code for attitudes towards suicide bombings against foreigners in Iraq, we use the PGAP’s next question:

What about suicide bombing carried out against Americans and other Westerners in Iraq? Do you personally believe that this is justifiable or not justifiable?

Here too, we dropped observations where the answer is “don’t know” and “refused” and coded the dependent variable *iraq* as follows: justifiable=1, not justifiable=0.

This survey question does not differentiate between attacks on American and Western soldiers, contractors, diplomats, or civilians. Generally, however, such a question would be assumed to refer in the Muslim world to the apparatus of occupation—US and allied military forces, Western diplomats, and their support personnel.¹⁵

After we dropped observations for which the respondent is a non-Muslim (only Muslims were asked the above questions) and missing answers, the total sample size dropped from 6250 to 3978 in the case of the dataset we use to test the correlates for *civilians* and 4038 in the case of the dataset for *iraq*. The smaller the proportion of Muslims in the country, the greater the reduction in the country’s sample

¹⁵ See Hafez (2007) for an analysis of suicide bombings in Iraq.

size. For example, the sample is smallest for Lebanon, where a significant share of the population is non-Muslim and largest for Pakistan and Indonesia where the population is mostly Muslim.

Table One describes the changes in the size of the samples and the margins of error based on the new sample sizes:

<Table One about here>

Hypotheses. The main independent variable is an education index that reflects the respondent's highest educational attainment. We propose the following hypothesis:

H₁: More educated individuals are less likely to support suicide bombings

We expect this hypothesis to hold when it comes to support for attacks against civilians because education encourages the kind of critical thinking that identifies and tackles moral dilemma such as the ones that would arise when civilians are attacked. We do not expect this hypothesis to be sustained by evidence in the case of attacks against foreign occupiers of Muslim lands because such attacks are widely perceived to be legitimate and morally uncontroversial among Muslims. We code *educindex* as follows: below primary education=0, primary education=1, secondary education=2, and higher education=3.

Some have argued that wealthier individuals are more likely to be ideologically extreme and committed because they have more time to dedicate to ideological pursuits or because of their desire to help the disenfranchised (Krueger 2007; Krueger and Maleckova 2003). Perhaps those who are more ideologically committed are also more inclined to support aggressive tactics (Lerner, 1958). Others disagree. Nobel laureate Kim Dae Jung argues that "At the bottom of terrorism is poverty. That is the main cause. Then there are other religious, national, and ideological differences." And fellow laureate Desmond Tutu believes that "External circumstances such as poverty and a sense of grievance and injustice can fill people with resentment and despair to the point of desperation", and presumably the use of desperate tactics such as suicide bombings.¹⁶ We therefore test for our second key hypothesis:

¹⁶ A number of political scientists argue that economic development and poverty alleviation reduce public support for violent contention (Burgoon, 2006; Gurr, 1970; Cragin and Chalk, 2003). A closely aligned argument is that free trade and its resulting income gains reduces public support for terrorism (Li and Schaub, 2004; McDonald, 2004).

H₂: People from wealthier households are more likely to support suicide bombings

We code the variable *pcincome* by converting the mean value of the monthly household income interval in the current currency from the PGAP survey to 2005 USD then dividing it by the number of people in the household. This produces the per-capita household income of the respondent. The per-capita value is a more valid indicator of socioeconomic status than total household income from the survey because households vary dramatically in size. In our models below, we transform this variable by using its square root so its variance would become comparable to other variables.

We also test eight rival hypotheses in models with both *civilians* and *iraq* as the dependent variables. Perhaps those who are not happy with their lives are more inclined to support violence to bring about change:

H₃: Those who are dissatisfied with how things are going in their country are more likely to support suicide bombing

We code *dissatisfaction* based on the respondent's answer to the question "Overall, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in our country today?" with "1" for "satisfied" and "2" for "dissatisfied".

Fear and feelings of threat have historically motivated the use of extreme and desperate methods in defense of self, community, homeland and religion. The Japanese used kamikaze attacks as the prospects of vengeful Americans on their shores became more likely, for example. It may be that Muslims who fear that their religion is under threat are more likely to support the use of such methods:

H₄: Those who believe that Islam is under threat are more likely to support suicide bombing

We code the binary variable *threat* as "0" if the respondent states that "there are no serious threats to Islam today" and "1" if she believes that "there are threats to Islam today".

It could be that individuals who consider themselves Muslims first (as opposed to Jordanian or Moroccan first) are less likely to feel solidarity with their fellow citizens and therefore be more likely to support attacks against them. Such individuals may also be more inclined to support attacks against occupiers of lands inhabited by fellow Muslims.

H₅: Those who consider themselves to be Muslim first are more likely to support suicide bombings

We code *identity* “1” if the respondent considers herself to be a member of her country’s people first, “2” if she considers herself to belong to both her country’s people and be a Muslim equally, and “3” if she considers herself a Muslim first.

Males and youths are generally considered in the sociology and psychology literature to be more aggressive than females. In contrast, Fair and Shepherd (2006) argue that females (and youths) in some Muslim countries are more likely to support suicide bombing and other forms of terrorism than males. We therefore test the following hypotheses:

H₆: Men are more likely to support suicide bombing than women

H₇: Younger individuals are more likely to support suicide bombing than older individuals

We code the binary variable *male* “1” if the respondent is male and “0” if female. We code *ageinterval* based on the age of the respondent: “1” if 18<age<29, “2” if 30<age<39, “3” if 40<age<49, “4” if 50<age<59, “5” if 60<age<69, “6” if 70<age.

Some critics of Islam such as Evangelical preacher Pat Robertson and neoconservative pundits argue that the religion itself encourages violence, so it may be that:

H₈: Devout Muslims are more likely to support suicide bombing than less devout ones

We code *religiosity* as “1” if the respondent says that “religion is very important in her life”, “2” if “somewhat important”, “3” if “not too important”, and “4” if “not at all important”.

Married people tend to be less inclined to support conflict because they are responsible for the welfare of a partner and, possibly, children. Therefore it could be that

H₉: People who were never married are more likely to support suicide bombing

We code the dummy variable *married* “1” if an individual has been married at least once and “0” if not.

We test for an additional hypothesis only in models with *civilians* as the dependent variable. Perhaps those who believe that their own government has sacrificed the national interest or Islamic

solidarity in its alliance with the United States against other Muslims are more ready to use extreme tactics to punish their country's population:

H₁₀: Those who believe that their government supports the U.S. government too much are more likely to support suicide bombings against their country's civilians

We code the variable *government* as follows: 1 if the respondent believes that "our government does not go along with the U.S. enough", 2 if "deals with the US about right", and 3 if "our government goes along with the U.S. too much".

Tessler and Robbins (2007) find in their analysis of surveys of Algerian and Jordanian publics that respondents' negative judgments about their own government and about U.S. foreign policy are correlated with approval of terrorism against the United States. We therefore also test for the following hypothesis in models with *iraq* as the dependent variable:

H₁₁: Those with an unfavorable opinion of the US are more likely to support suicide bombing against U.S. and other Westerners in Iraq

We code *usopinion* based on the following scale: very favorable=1, somewhat favorable=2, somewhat unfavorable=3, very unfavorable=4.

Model Specification. We use an ordered probit for models with *civilians* as the dependent variable because of the discrete nature and ordering of the responses (from "never justified" to "often justified"). We also use the ordered probit procedure for models with the binary *iraq* as the dependent variable because ordered probit is identical to the commonly used binary probit for such variables (Wooldridge 2002, Long and Freese 2006).¹⁷

Analysis and Findings

Descriptive Statistics. Table Two shows the distribution of educational attainment of the entire sample of respondents in the six countries. Pakistan has the lowest overall educational attainments, with over 51 percent of respondents not completing primary education; in the remaining countries, over half of the

¹⁷ We use Stata SE 10.0 and the SPost package developed by Scott Long for the analyses in this paper.

respondents completed either primary or secondary education. Higher educational attainment exceeds 10 percent in Lebanon and Turkey, and varies between five and eight percent in the other four countries.

<Table 2 about here>

Table Three presents the relationship between public educational attainment and attitudes towards suicide bombings (and other forms of violence) against civilian targets. A consistent trend is that those with low levels of education (below primary education and primary education) are more likely to respond “Don’t know/Refused”; this is similar to trends from other surveys where those with low levels of education are less likely to express an opinion. When other variables are not considered, there is no clear correlation between educational attainment and attitudes towards suicide bombing, with the exception of Indonesia and Pakistan where higher education is associated with drops in support for such attacks. This is what led Krueger to believe that there is no basis to the widely accepted relationship between education and support for suicide attacks (Krueger 2007, 25-27). We show that the relationship becomes more meaningful when we use multivariate analyses.

<Table 3 about here>

Table Four presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used for the ordered probit regressions as well as in the original sample that precedes the exclusion of incomplete observations. The two datasets we use for regressions with *iraq* and *civilians* as dependent variables largely overlap, but not exactly because we did not want to exclude cases unnecessarily (some respondents answer the question on Iraq but not the one about attacks on civilians and vice versa). The distribution for most variables did not change much after excluding observations with missing entries, with some exceptions. Those without primary education become less represented (24% versus 27% in the original dataset) while those with secondary education are better represented (33% as opposed to 30%). Those who believe that Islam is under threat are better represented (68% versus 62% in the general sample). Women become better represented (54% versus 50%). Finally, those who have a very favorable opinion of the U.S. are less represented (9% versus 12%) and those with very unfavorable opinion of the U.S. gain (47% versus 42%). We do not believe that these changes justify the adoption of a weighting scheme.

<Table 4 about here>

Overall, the sample informs us that members of Muslim publics in the six countries generally are very devout (religion is very important for more than eight-tenths of respondents), consider themselves to be Muslim first (more than 55% consider themselves Muslims more so than part of the country's people), and believe that Islam is under threat (more than 62 percent do). They have a young population with almost 40 percent of adults between 18 and 29. Most have a poor opinion of the U.S. (more than 60% have a somewhat or very unfavorable opinion of the U.S.)¹⁸

Ordered Probit Results. Table 5 presents the ordered probit results for the regression models with *civilians* as the dependent variable. The aggregate probit is clustered by country. We find that our education index, per capita income and belief that Islam is under threat (*threat*) are all statistically significant in the regression on the combined sample of respondents from all six Muslim publics.

<Table 5 about here>

The education index is also statistically significant in the regressions for three of the six country-specific regressions and *threat* in four of these regressions. Per capita income is only significant in the regression on the aggregate sample. There is no evidence that other variables in the model are statistically significant so we propose that dissatisfaction with the country's situation and the government, primary identification as Muslim, religiosity, gender, married status and age have no effect on attitudes towards suicide bombings on civilians. We interpret the effect of the coefficients for *educindex* (p=0.01), *pcincome* (p=0.01) and *threat* (p=0.02) on support for attacks on civilians in Figure One.

<Figure One about here>

Support for suicide bombings against civilians drops as education increases. An individual with no formal education is twice as likely (between 1.94 and 2.2 times, depending on income and perception of threat) than someone with college education to believe that attacks on civilians are sometimes or often

¹⁸ For more descriptive statistics, see the Pew PGAP Report, "Arab and Muslim Perceptions of the United States," by Andrew Kohut, November 10, 2005, available online at <<http://pewresearch.org/pubs/6/arab-and-muslim-perceptions-of-the-united-states>> (accessed June 4, 2008).

justified. Gaining primary education alone makes an individual 20% less likely to believe that suicide bombings against civilians are justified. Those who stop their education at high school are 23% more likely to think that suicide bombings against civilians are justified than college graduates.

The higher the individual's per capita household income, the more likely he or she is to believe that attacks on civilians are sometimes or often justified. Moving from the 25th percentile of income to the 75th percentile increases the odds of the respondent adopting such attitudes by around 45%. Moving from the 10th percentile to the 90th increases the odds by 90%. Believing that Islam is under threat makes an individual 1.8 times more likely to believe that attacks on civilians are sometimes or often justified.

Table Six presents the ordered probit models identifying the correlates of support for attacks on foreigners in Iraq.

<Table 6 about here>

Educindex is marginally significant in the aggregate dataset ($p=0.07$) and not significant in any of the country-specific regressions. *Pcincome* is highly significant ($p=0.02$) in the aggregate model but not the country models. *Threat* ($p=0.000$) is highly significant in the aggregate model and four of the six country regressions indicating that those who believe that Islam is under threat are more likely to find attacks against foreigners in Iraq justifiable. The coefficients are in the same direction as in the models with the *civilians* dependent variable.

The other statistically significant variables are different from the ones that were significant in the models for *civilians*. *Usopinion* is marginally significant ($p=0.07$) in the aggregate model but highly significant in the country-specific models. As one would expect, those who have an unfavorable opinion of the U.S. are more likely to find attacks against Americans in Iraq justifiable. Males (*male*, $p=0.03$) are more likely to find attacks on Americans in Iraq justifiable and religious Muslims (*religiosity*, $p=0.04$) less likely to do so.

The differences and similarities in the statistical significance of variables are meaningful. While higher income in the context of less developed economies and feeling that Islam is under threat influence attitudes in the case of attacks on both civilians and Americans in Iraq, education seems more likely to

matter in models identifying the correlates of support for attacks on civilians than in models doing the same for attacks on foreigners.

Differences among countries. The characteristics of those who believe that suicide bombings against civilians are justifiable also differ from country to country. We therefore provide a brief substantive analysis of these differences in the following paragraphs. Figure Two provide descriptive statistics of the general Muslim publics' support for suicide bombings against civilians and foreigners in Iraq in each of the six countries. Eight percent of respondents from the six countries believe that suicide bombings against civilians are often justified and 14% feel that they are sometimes justified. Fifty-five percent find them to be never justified. Many more (38%) find such attacks on Americans and other Westerners in Iraq to be justified, as opposed to 52% who find them to never be justified.

<Figure 2 about here>

Indonesia. Support for suicide bombings against both civilians and foreigners in Iraq is below average with very few Indonesian Muslims not expressing an opinion regarding attacks on civilians. Fourteen percent of Indonesians find suicide bombings against civilians to be sometimes or often justified and 26% find such attacks against Americans and other Westerners in Iraq to be justified. Older and more educated Indonesian Muslims are less likely to support suicide bombings on civilians. The effect of age may be more important in Indonesia than elsewhere because of the more recent rise of Islamist movements in this country as opposed to South Asian and Middle Eastern ones. Indonesian Muslims do not differ much from the aggregate dataset of six Muslim publics in respect to the correlates of support for attacks on Americans in Iraq: those who feel that Islam is threatened and have a poor opinion of the U.S. are more likely to support such attacks. Those who identify as Muslims first are also more likely to support attacks on foreigners in Iraq.

Jordan. Jordanian Muslims have the highest rate of support for suicide bombings against civilians (43% find them to be often or sometimes justified) and among the highest against Americans and other Westerners in Iraq (49% justified versus 44% never justified). In the case of Jordan as well, feelings that Islam is threatened are strongly associated with belief that the two types of attacks are justifiable. The

effect of education on support for attacks on civilians is the opposite of the finding for the aggregate sample, probably because Jordanian respondents, at least half of whom are from families displaced from the other side of the Jordan River, will think of attacks on Israeli civilians when asked the survey question. This matters because the context of the question is framed by what has become a total war affecting civilians on both sides of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Older Jordanians are more likely to support attacks on civilians probably because they have had direct exposure and closer links to the events that caused them to become refugees in Jordan, events that included attacks on civilians. Jordanians who have a negative opinion of the U.S. and who feel Islam is under threat are more likely to support suicide bombings against foreigners in Iraq while identifying as Muslim first and being dissatisfied reduces support.

Lebanon. Support for suicide bombings is high. Thirty two percent of Lebanese Muslim respondents find such attacks to be often or sometimes justified against civilians and 49% find them to be justified against Americans and Westerners in Iraq (41% never justified). Lebanese Muslims who feel that Islam is under threat and that the government collaborates too much with the United States are more likely to support suicide bombings against civilians. The dataset does not code for Muslim sect (Sunni or Shi`a) but the numbers seem to mask a sectarian divide with Lebanese Shi`a supporting such attacks more than their Sunni counterparts. Respondents from regions with more Shi`a than Sunnis (South and Bekaa) believe that attacks on civilians are “often justified” in greater numbers (24.4%) than respondents from areas that are mostly Sunni or mixed (North and West Beirut at 13%). While respondents from all Muslim regions are more supportive of attacks against foreigners in Iraq, respondents from shi`a areas also find such attacks “justifiable” in greater numbers than respondents from mostly Sunni or mixed regions (64.6% versus 48.7%). Those with higher household per-capita income, with a negative opinion of the U.S., who feel Islam is under threat, and who self-identify as “Muslim” more so than “Lebanese” are more likely to support suicide bombings against foreigners in Iraq. Sectarian differences are probably at work here as well. The strong Shi`a ideological mobilization under the banner of Hizballah has created a large block of Lebanese Shi`a with a consistent set of attitudes that both view the United States as

effectively threatening Islam and identifies with other Shi`a in Iraq and the Islamic Republic of Iran (Hamzeh 2004, Norton 2007).

Morocco. Moroccans are the least likely of the six Muslim publics to support suicide bombings against civilians (only 10% find them often or sometimes justified, 81% never justified) and the most likely to support them against Americans and other Westerners in Iraq (56% justified, 40% never justified). Only Moroccans who feel that Islam is under threat are more likely to support suicide bombings against civilians. Having a poor opinion of the U.S. and being male also increase the odds of support for suicide bombings against foreigners in Iraq. Education and poverty do not appear to be statistically significant in the case of Morocco.

Pakistan. A quarter of Pakistanis believe that suicide bombings against civilians are often or sometimes justified and 29% find them to be justified against Westerners in Iraq (46% and 56% never justified respectively). Pakistanis with more education are less likely to support suicide bombings against civilians. Those who feel that Islam is threatened, males, and those who feel they are “Muslims” more so than “Pakistani” are more likely to support such attacks. Pakistanis who believe they are more “Muslim” than “Pakistani” are less inclined to support suicide bombings against Westerners in Iraq while males, those who are dissatisfied, and those who have a negative opinion of the U.S. are more inclined to do so.

Turkey. Thirteen percent of Turks find suicide bombings against civilians to be often or sometimes justified and 23% believe them to be justified against Westerners in Iraq. The only independent variable that is statistically significant in terms of support for suicide bombings against civilians is religiosity with those who are religious being less inclined to do so. This may be in part because the main organizer of such attacks in the past has been the secular, at one point Marxist, PKK. It could also be a defensive reaction in a country where religion is maligned by state institution as a source of many ills, including violence. Another factor is that many religious Muslims in Turkey adhere to very peaceful interpretations of the religion. Increased religiosity also negatively impacts support for attacks on Americans and other Westerners in Iraq while negative perceptions of the U.S. increases support for such attacks.

Notes of Caution and Robustness Checks

The Pew surveys are some of the best available today to gauge support for suicide bombings among Muslim publics. It is important to understand, however, that respondents might answer such survey questions strategically out of concern that divulging their preferences might make them vulnerable to persecution. Several variables may be affected by this coding issue, including our two dependent variables *iraq* and *civilians*, as well as *government*, *dissatisfaction* and *identity*. We expect the survey to show less support for suicide bombings on civilians, more support for government, and higher satisfaction for some countries than candid answers would reveal. The income-related variables may also be flawed because of attitudes towards divulging information about wealth in Muslim cultures.

The dataset also lacks information on the type of schooling that people have received. Krueger (2007) suggests that religious training may influence attitudes towards suicide bombing (though he is unable to test this hypothesis). However, according to Robert Hefner and Muhammad Zaman (2007), madrassas (or Islamic schools) cannot account for the scale of support for suicide bombing because the share of support is considerably greater than the share of respondents who have attended such institutions. Tahir Andrabi and World Bank colleagues report, for example, that less than 1 percent of all students in Pakistan attend madrassas (Andrabi et al. 2006). Moreover, most madrassas in the Muslim world remain pedagogically and theologically pluralistic, and strongly condemn suicide bombing as a sin (Hefner and Zaman, 2007).

We are not concerned about collinearity between our two key independent variables because, unlike in the West, education and income are not significantly correlated (around .3) in the samples of Muslim publics we study.

We conduct several sets of robustness checks on our findings. We substitute other independent variables to variables which coding may be contested and check for the significance of key variables after dropping others. We report the regression results for the robustness tests in Table Seven for regressions on *civilians* and in Table Eight for regressions on *iraq*.

<Tables 7 and 8 about here>

To check for the robustness of our findings on education, we substitute separately two dummy variables to *educindex*: *college* (1=attended college) and *hscollege* (1=attended high school or college). The same variables remain significant with similar signs of the coefficients. Only in one case does a new variable become statistically significant (*married* when we substitute *college* to *educindex* while regressing on civilians).

We make four substitutions for our other key explanatory variable *sqrtpcincome*. They are: *pcincome* (household per capita income), \ln (*pcincome*), *incquartile* (an index with “1” for those in the lower quartile that increases to “4” for those in the upper quartile), and *mincome* (a dummy variable that divides the population between those above and below the median). None of these substitutions causes substantial changes in the statistical significance of key explanatory variables. We include models with the *pcincome* substitution in Tables Seven and Eight and report the others in a supplemental paper to preserve space.

We also substitute *cthreat* to *threat* for the model with *iraq* as the dependent variable. *cthreat* codes the answer for the survey question “How worried are you, if at all, that the US could become a military threat to our country someday? Are you very worried, somewhat worried, not too worried, or not at all worried?”¹⁹ The substitution produces only one meaningful change: education becomes statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

The sample from Lebanon has the largest margin of error of our country samples ($\pm 5\%$) and may therefore affect our results. We therefore rerun our model on a dataset that excludes the observations from Lebanon. One change results: income (*sqrtpcincome*) becomes statistically insignificant in the model explaining attacks in Iraq, and dissatisfaction becomes statistically significant in the model explaining attacks on civilians.

We also divide the dataset for *civilians* into the nearly equal parts for which this question differs slightly (one version adds the words “in our country”) and check for changes in the coefficients and

¹⁹ Coded: very worried=1, somewhat worried=2, not too worried=3, not at all worried=4.

statistical significance. Respondents to the question that does not include “in our country” generally have the same correlates of support for suicide bombings as the combined sample. On the other hand, both education and income are not statistically significant when the survey question includes “in our country”. This may be in part because of the tiny number and proportion of those who have college education that find suicide attacks “in our country” to be justifiable for strategic or sincere reasons (4 out of 103 versus 29 out of 238 for the other version of the question find it to be “often justified”). Similarly, only 19 out of 516 (3.7%) respondents in the top economic quartile find such attacks against civilians “in our country” to be “often justified” versus 56 out of 455 (12.3%) for the non-specific question. Generally, many more respondents are ready to find attacks against civilians to be often justified when “in our country” is omitted (12.9% as opposed to 4.9%). A possible reason for the difference is that the omission of the words “in our country” allows the respondent to answer sincerely without appearing to support groups opposed to the government. The absence of these words also may imply that the attacks are against civilians from the opposite side of existing conflicts as opposed to compatriots or fellow Muslims.

We also drop from our model a number of variables (a subset of *religiosity*, *dissatisfaction*, *married*, *age*) least likely to influence attitudes regarding suicide bombings to reduce the probability that they influence our findings but find no change in the significance of our key variables.

We generally feel confident about our findings on the basis of these robustness tests.

Policy Implications

The correlates of support for suicide bombings differ from one country to another but it would be wasteful to think in terms of developing fifty different approaches, one for every Muslim-plurality country, and many more for Muslim minorities. It is more sensible to address the most important factors that address the readiness to support such attacks. Of course, foreign policy cannot be formulated on the basis of reducing suicide bombings on U.S. or civilian targets, but the two most obvious policy

recommendations have many other benefits as well. They should be implemented simultaneously, not in isolation.

Our first policy recommendation is based on our finding that Muslims who feel that Islam is under threat are considerably more likely to support suicide bombings against both civilians and foreigners in Iraq. We recommend that the U.S. adopts a foreign policy and practices that respect the dignity, welfare, interests and life of Muslims everywhere. This would improve opinion of the U.S. and reduce the feeling that Islam is under threat.

The United States should simultaneously encourage economic and educational development in the Muslim world. Educated Muslims identify and confront the moral dilemmas that come with the killing of civilians better than less educated ones. They are also more capable of dealing with the clear Islamic prohibition on suicide that some extremist Islamist ideologues have undermined by reinterpreting suicide as “martyrdom”. This is of course a double edged sword, because with education and economic improvement comes ideological assertiveness. This is why economic and educational development must go hand in hand with a more humane American foreign policy that does not encourage hostility against the United States. The ideology that educated and successful Muslims adopt could become one of supporting trade, economic integration and cooperative international security if they feel that the United States is not a source of threat to Islam and Muslims.

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Table 1. Sample size after excluding non-Muslims and incomplete observations, Spring 2005

Country	Original N	Muslim population	Reduced sample- <i>civilians</i>		Reduced sample- <i>iraq</i>	
			N	Margin of error	N	Margin of error
Indonesia	1022	202,000,000	801	±3.5%	837	±3.4%
Jordan	1000	5,800,000	887	±3.3%	840	±3.4%
Lebanon	1000	2,300,000	385	±5.0%	446	±4.6%
Morocco	1000	34,000,000	552	±4.2%	565	±4.1%
Pakistan	1225	160,000,000	727	±3.6%	738	±3.6%
Turkey	1003	71,000,000	624	±3.9%	610	±4.0%

Notes: Muslim population estimates from the CIA World Factbook

Table 2: Public educational attainment, Spring 2005

	All	Indonesia	Jordan	Lebanon	Morocco	Pakistan	Turkey
Below primary	27.9	11.8	41.2	14.2	35.5	51.1	8.9
Primary	34.1	35.0	20.9	37.1	35.9	35.2	40.2
Secondary	29.4	48.1	29.9	35.3	20.8	7.0	39.9
Higher	<u>8.6</u>	<u>5.1</u>	<u>8.0</u>	<u>13.4</u>	<u>7.8</u>	<u>6.7</u>	<u>11.0</u>
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Notes: Reflects the attitudes of adult Muslims (aged 18 and above).

Table 3: Public educational attainment and attitudes towards suicide bombing targeting civilians, Spring 2005

	All	Indonesia	Jordan	Lebanon	Morocco	Pakistan	Turkey
<i>All levels of education:</i>							
Never justified	55.0	67.3	28.9	35.0	81.1	45.8	64.9
Rarely justified	16.2	16.9	26.7	26.3	4.8	18.2	8.5
Sometimes justified	14.3	12.1	31.2	16.9	4.8	12.5	10.2
Often justified	8.1	1.9	12.2	15.5	5.6	12.4	3.0
Don't know/Refused	<u>6.4</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>6.3</u>	<u>3.7</u>	<u>11.1</u>	<u>13.4</u>
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<i>Below primary:</i>							
Never justified	47.3	63.2	27.6	29.2	79.9	40.0	52.9
Rarely justified	18.3	23.2	28.5	31.5	4.3	18.5	5.9
Sometimes justified	15.5	10.9	30.8	19.1	4.5	12.8	10.6
Often justified	9.6	0.0	11.4	10.1	5.0	14.1	1.2
Don't know/Refused	<u>9.3</u>	<u>2.7</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>10.1</u>	<u>6.3</u>	<u>14.6</u>	<u>29.4</u>
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<i>Primary:</i>							
Never justified	58.0	33.5	33.5	32.1	80.9	48.8	64.6
Rarely justified	14.7	21.8	21.8	29.4	5.8	17.8	7.9
Sometimes justified	13.5	30.1	30.1	16.6	5.5	13.4	9.9
Often justified	7.6	14.1	14.1	17.6	5.4	11.6	3.2
Don't know/Refused	<u>6.2</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>4.3</u>	<u>2.4</u>	<u>8.4</u>	<u>14.4</u>
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<i>Secondary:</i>							
Never justified	57.9	68.2	26.9	38.5	83.6	51.1	66.8
Rarely justified	16.2	16.6	24.5	24.0	4.4	23.1	10.4
Sometimes justified	15.0	11.3	36.7	14.4	4.6	12.8	9.6
Often justified	6.9	3.1	11.5	15.4	7.0	9.2	2.8
Don't know/Refused	<u>4.0</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>7.7</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>3.8</u>	<u>10.4</u>
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<i>Higher:</i>							
Never justified	60.4	78.3	30.6	39.2	80.0	67.9	68.7
Sometimes justified	14.6	10.9	38.9	19.0	2.9	12.7	6.1
Rarely justified	11.2	5.5	15.3	21.5	3.5	5.9	13.1
Often justified	8.0	0.0	13.8	16.5	5.8	6.3	4.0
Don't know/Refused	<u>5.8</u>	<u>5.3</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>3.8</u>	<u>7.8</u>	<u>7.2</u>	<u>8.1</u>
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Notes: Reflects the attitudes of adult Muslims (aged 18 and above).

Table 4. Descriptive statistics (percentages) of variables in the original sample (N=6250) and the samples used for the Probit regressions (N=3978 for *civilians*, N=4038 for *iraq*), Spring 2005

Variable	Sample	Values					
civilians		Never justified	Rarely justified	Sometimes justified	Often justified	DK /Refused	
	Original	56.03%	15.83	14.26	7.90	5.98	
	Civilians Probit	56.66%	18.05	16.69	8.60	0	
iraq		Justifiable		Not justifiable		DK /Refused	
	Original	37.72%		53.02		9.26	
	Iraq Probit	42.50%		57.50		0	
Educindex		not completed primary	completed primary	secondary	college	DK /Refused	
	Original	26.64%	34.90	29.67	8.79	0	
	Civilians Probit	23.79%	34.28	33.17	8.75	0	
	Iraq Probit	24.33%	34.54	32.56	8.57	0	
Sqrtpcincome		Mean			Std Deviation		
	Original	12.37			9.70		
	Civilians Probit	11.81			8.95		
	Iraq Probit	11.86			9.11		
Threat		No serious threats to Islam today		there are threats to Islam today		DK/Refused	
	Original	31.55%		62.12		6.33	
	Civilians Probit	31.93		68.07		--	
	Iraq Probit	32.00		68.00		--	
Identity		country's people	both country's people and Muslim	Muslim		DK /Refused	
	Original	20.40%	22.16	57.02		0.43	
	Civilians Probit	22.75	20.97	56.28		0	
	Iraq Probit	22.63	21.17	56.19		0	
Male		Male			Female		
	Original	49.58%			50.42		
	Civilians Probit	45.53			54.47		
	Iraq Probit	46.41			53.59		
Ageinterval		18<age<29	30<age<39	40<age<49	50<age<59	60<age<69	70<age
	Original	37.81%	25.31	18.40	12.40	3.98	2.10
	Civilians Probit	38.46	26.32	18.50	12.42	3.24	1.06
	Iraq Probit	37.94	26.35	18.85	12.38	3.27	1.21
Religiosity		religion is very important	somewhat important	not too important	not at all important	DK/Refused	
	Original	81.04%	11.95	4.43	2.00	.58	
	Civilians Probit	85.72	10.91	2.54	.83	--	
	Iraq Probit	85.71	11.02	2.53	.74	--	
Dissatisfaction		Satisfied with country		dissatisfied		DK/Refused	
	Original	48.85		48.75		2.40	
	Civilians Probit	50.38		49.62		--	
	Iraq Probit	48.84		51.16		--	
Married		Married			Not Married		
	Original	64.43%			35.57		
	Civilians Probit	65.66%			34.34		
	Iraq Probit	65.85%			34.15		
Usopinion		Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	
	Original	11.76%	20.80	19.55	41.57	6.32	
	Iraq Probit	9.44	21.62	21.84	47.10	--	
government		Deal with US about right	Not enough	Go along too much	DK/Refused		
	Original	26.10%	26.69	33.44	13.78		
	Civilians Probit	29.81	31.00	39.19	--		

Table 5. Ordered Probit results on public attitudes towards suicide attacks on civilians, Spring 2005

	All	Indonesia	Jordan	Lebanon	Morocco	Pakistan	Turkey
Education Index	-0.136 ** (0.054)	-0.165 ** (0.066)	0.112 * (0.051)	-0.089 (0.074)	-0.021 (0.080)	-0.134 * (0.055)	-0.008 (0.086)
Sqrt pcincome	0.019 ** (0.008)	0.024 (0.019)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.009 (0.007)	0.014 (0.010)	-0.033 (0.021)	0.001 (0.007)
Dissatisfaction	-0.100 (0.085)	-0.023 (0.093)	-0.014 (0.086)	0.052 (0.126)	-0.031 (0.124)	0.053 (0.092)	-0.044 (0.108)
Government	0.487 (0.075)	0.016 (0.057)	-0.198 ** (0.056)	0.266 ** (0.078)	0.056 (0.082)	0.081 (0.052)	0.036 (0.058)
Threat	0.341 * (0.147)	0.013 (0.095)	0.657 ** (0.106)	0.525 ** (0.130)	0.803 ** (0.203)	0.236 ** (0.089)	0.093 (0.114)
Identity	0.020 (0.056)	0.094 (0.051)	-0.013 (0.047)	-0.074 (0.072)	0.027 (0.098)	-0.180 * (0.085)	0.126 (0.069)
Male	0.065 (0.068)	0.107 (0.093)	0.013 (0.074)	-0.095 (0.115)	0.172 (0.129)	0.329 ** (0.095)	0.107 (0.106)
Ageinterval	-0.026 (0.034)	-0.165 ** (0.042)	0.099 * (0.042)	-0.060 (0.050)	-0.037 (0.064)	0.042 (0.036)	-0.055 (0.053)
Religiosity	-0.037 (0.101)	0.090 (0.097)	-0.100 (0.128)	-0.074 (0.078)	0.118 (0.218)	0.048 (0.186)	-0.195 * (0.082)
Married	0.100 (0.054)	0.101 (0.126)	-0.127 (0.089)	-0.058 (0.132)	-0.153 (0.168)	0.107 (0.108)	0.067 (0.128)
Cut 1	0.255 0.361	0.441 0.326	-0.297 0.277	0.148 0.382	1.966 0.529	0.177 0.394	0.682 0.370
Cut 2	0.768 0.336	0.997 0.327	0.445 0.274	0.913 0.383	2.202 0.532	0.749 0.396	1.060 0.372
Cut 3	1.493 0.244	1.981 0.337	1.537 0.275	1.515 0.384	2581 0.535	1.252 0.397	1.860 0.387
Pseudo R ²	0.020	0.017	0.029	0.378	0.035	0.025	0.015
N	3976	801	887	385	552	727	624

Notes: (1) *denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level; **denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level; statistical significance based on z-values; (2) Regional controls for “All” are country-level (i.e. six countries, therefore six controls) (3) The analysis excludes “Don’t know/ Refused” responses.

Table 6. Ordered Probit results on public attitudes towards suicide bombings on foreigners in Iraq, Spring 2005

	All	Indonesia	Jordan	Lebanon	Morocco	Pakistan	Turkey
Education Index	-0.074 (0.041)	0.045 (0.073)	0.134 (0.083)	-0.101 (0.109)	0.040 (0.067)	-0.094 (0.062)	-0.030 (0.008)
Sqrt pcincome	0.018 * (0.008)	-0.003 (0.020)	-0.002 (0.010)	0.021 * (0.009)	0.002 (0.009)	0.012 (0.024)	-0.013 (0.008)
Dissatisfaction	0.066 (0.092)	0.002 (0.098)	-0.321 ** (0.125)	0.328 * (0.169)	-0.086 (0.113)	0.204 * (0.108)	0.197 (0.113)
US Opinion	0.305 (0.166)	0.263 ** (0.057)	1.660 ** (0.116)	0.858 ** (0.093)	0.162 ** (0.047)	0.098 * (0.050)	0.141 * (0.059)
Threat	0.504 ** (0.130)	0.375 ** (0.098)	1.050 ** (0.291)	0.987 ** (0.196)	0.158 (0.149)	0.088 (0.103)	-0.005 (0.118)
Identity	0.071 (0.061)	0.127 * (0.055)	-0.287 ** (0.086)	0.254 ** (0.091)	-0.091 (0.101)	-0.239 ** (0.093)	0.005 (0.069)
Male	0.193 * (0.087)	0.055 (0.098)	0.110 (0.114)	-0.073 (0.149)	0.232 * (0.114)	0.718 ** (0.109)	0.198 (0.113)
Ageinterval	-0.025 (0.018)	-0.032 (0.043)	0.068 (0.065)	-0.071 (0.071)	-0.059 (0.056)	-0.023 (0.043)	-0.040 (0.049)
Religiosity	0.180 * (0.088)	0.089 (0.120)	-0.123 (0.203)	0.023 (0.101)	-0.080 (0.249)	0.177 (0.245)	-0.315 ** (0.095)
Married	0.019 (0.094)	-0.053 (0.138)	-0.205 (0.135)	0.129 (0.177)	0.015 (0.143)	0.150 (0.129)	0.121 (0.136)
Cut 1	2.636 (0.364)	1.815 (0.358)	5.600 (0.557)	4.816 (0.544)	-0.179 (0.496)	1.127 (0.477)	0.732 (0.404)
Pseudo R ²	0.099	0.057	0.459	0.383	0.028	0.070	0.045
N	4036	837	840	446	565	738	610

Notes: (1) * denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level; ** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level; statistical significance based on z-values; (2) Regional controls for “All” are country-level (i.e. six countries, therefore six controls) (3) The analysis excludes “Don’t know/ Refused” responses.

Table 7. Ordered Probit results on public attitudes towards suicide bombings against civilians using alternative proxy variables and model specifications, Spring 2005

	Original model	Education substitution 1	Education substitution 2	Income substitution	Civilians "in our country"	Civilians in general	Drop Lebanon	Most likely variables
Education Index	-0.136 ** (0.054)			-0.128 ** (0.049)	-0.077 (0.066)	-0.186 ** (0.039)	-0.128 * (0.055)	-0.128 ** (0.046)
college		-0.193 * (0.091)						
Hscollege			-0.171 * (0.088)					
Sqrt pcincome	0.019 ** (0.008)	0.016 * (0.008)	0.017 * (0.007)		0.004 (0.007)	0.030 ** (0.006)	0.009 (0.010)	0.016 * (0.008)
Pcincome				0.000 ** (0.000)				
Dissatisfaction	-0.100 (0.085)	-0.125 (0.083)	-0.116 (0.084)	-0.105 (0.087)	-0.269 * (0.129)	0.027 (0.108)	-0.168 ** (0.079)	-0.101 (0.087)
Government	0.487 (0.075)	0.049 (0.076)	0.050 (0.076)	0.046 (0.076)	0.027 (0.058)	0.034 (0.083)	0.084 (0.079)	0.051 (0.074)
Threat	0.341 * (0.147)	0.343 * (0.149)	0.344 * (0.151)	0.366 * (0.152)	0.237 ** (0.086)	0.465 * (0.219)	0.325 * (0.155)	0.341 * (0.152)
Identity	0.020 (0.056)	0.029 (0.062)	0.022 (0.058)	0.016 (0.058)	-0.015 (0.066)	0.073 (0.060)	0.044 (0.053)	0.022 (0.062)
Male	0.065 (0.068)	0.049 (0.061)	0.053 (0.061)	0.062 (0.068)	0.044 (0.066)	0.084 (0.081)	0.088 (0.074)	
Ageinterval	-0.026 (0.034)	0.002 (0.033)	-0.011 (0.035)	-0.021 (0.034)	-0.004 (0.042)	-0.047 (0.027)	-0.032 (0.039)	
Religiosity	-0.037 (0.101)	0.037 (0.105)	0.041 (0.102)	0.026 (0.103)	-0.047 (0.126)	0.088 (0.078)	0.096 (0.113)	
Married	0.100 (0.054)	0.098 * (0.048)	0.092 (0.049)	0.074 (0.069)	0.026 (0.098)	0.140 ** (0.044)	0.073 * (0.034)	
Cut 1	0.255 (0.361)	0.796 (0.412)	0.738 (0.398)	0.462 (0.432)	-0.121 (0.511)	1.131 (0.289)	0.827 (0.435)	0.439 (0.141)
Cut 2	0.768 (0.336)	1.308 (0.411)	1.250 (0.394)	0.975 (0.408)	0.401 (0.491)	1.656 (0.273)	1.320 (0.435)	0.953 (0.107)
Cut 3	1.493 (0.244)	2.030 (0.482)	1.973 (0.464)	1.700 (0.450)	1.278 (0.514)	2.302 (0.329)	2.077 (0.496)	1.676 (0.202)
Pseudo R ²	0.020	0.017	0.017	0.019	0.012	0.039	0.020	0.019
N	3976	3976	3976	3976	2121	1855	3591	3976

Notes: (1) * denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level; ** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level; statistical significance based on z-values; (2) Regional controls for "All" are country-level (i.e. six countries, therefore six controls); (3) The analysis excludes "Don't know/ Refused" responses

Table 8. Ordered Probit results on public attitudes towards suicide bombings against Americans and other foreigners in Iraq using alternative proxy variables and models, Spring 2005

	Original specification	Education Substitution 1	Education Substitution 2	Income substitution	<i>Cthreat</i> substitution	Drop Lebanon	Most likely variables
Education Index	-0.074 (0.041)			-0.054 (0.041)	-0.066 * (0.031)	-0.074 (0.039)	-0.059 (0.035)
College		-0.095 (0.085)					
Hscollege			-0.112 (0.072)				
Sqrt pcincome	0.018 * (0.008)	0.017 * (0.007)	0.018 * (0.007)		0.021 ** (0.007)	0.016 (0.013)	0.018 * (0.007)
Pcincome				0.000 * (0.000)			
Dissatisfaction	0.066 (0.092)	0.051 (0.089)	0.059 (0.091)	0.063 (0.098)	0.047 (0.117)	-0.001 (0.067)	
US Opinion	0.305 (0.166)	0.306 (0.166)	0.307 (0.166)	0.303 (0.168)	0.317 (0.169)	0.260 (0.176)	0.306 (0.166)
Threat	0.504 ** (0.130)	0.503 ** (0.132)	0.504 ** (0.132)	0.528 ** (0.132)		0.433 ** (0.127)	0.505 ** (0.132)
cthreat					-0.226 * (0.098)		
Identity	0.071 (0.061)	0.077 (0.065)	0.071 (0.061)	0.065 (0.068)	0.087 (0.066)	0.062 (0.068)	0.071 (0.065)
Male	0.193 * (0.087)	0.184 * (0.084)	0.189 * (0.082)	0.182 * (0.079)	0.203 * (0.087)	0.209 * (0.098)	0.187 * (0.086)
Ageinterval	-0.025 (0.018)	-0.010 (0.013)	-0.019 (0.019)	-0.016 (0.021)	-0.066 (0.018)	-0.021 (0.019)	
Religiosity	0.180 * (0.088)	0.182 * (0.091)	0.183 * (0.089)	0.153 (0.104)	.0184 * (0.074)	0.240 * (0.106)	0.176 * (0.088)
Married	0.019 (0.094)	0.017 (0.093)	0.015 (0.091)	-0.037 (0.098)	0.004 (0.079)	-0.017 (0.085)	
Cut 1	2.636 (0.364)	2.729 (0.359)	2.688 (0.356)	2.371 (0.444)	2.001 (0.405)	2.541 (0.424)	2.576 (0.408)
Pseudo R ²	0.099	0.098	0.099	0.095	0.095	0.077	0.098
<i>N</i>	4036	4036	4036	4036	4036	3590	4036

Notes: (1) * denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level; ** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level; statistical significance based on z-values; (2) Regional controls for “All” are country-level (i.e. six countries, therefore six controls); (3) The analysis excludes “Don’t know/ Refused” responses.

Figure 1: Predicted probability of support for suicide bombings on civilians by educational attainment, per-capita household income, and belief that Islam is under threat, Spring 2005




Figure 2: Support for suicide bombings against civilians and foreigners in Iraq per country, Spring 2005

